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Abstract
This paper documents the increase in R&D intensity in the UK manufac-
turing sector in the period following the introduction of R&D tax credits in
2000-02. This increase is broadly in line with that predicted by econometric
studies of the impact of R&D tax credits, notably Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van
Reenen (2002). If anything, UK manufacturing R&D intensity has risen
faster than their model predicts. The timing of this increase is not simply
explained by trends in neighbouring economies, although one puzzle is that
the increase is largely conned to high tech sub-sectors of manufacturing.
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1 Introduction
Tax incentives are one of the main policy tools used by governments to inuence
the level of business expenditure on research and development (BERD). The UK
government introduced signicant tax credits for R&D spending by small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 2000, and for R&D spending by larger rms in
2002.1 This short paper uses aggregate and sectoral data to examine developments
in UK BERD following the introduction of these tax incentives, and provides some
comparison to recent trends in other developed countries.
There is an extensive literature which quanties the e¤ect of scal incentives
on the cost of investing in research and development (R&D), and relates the level
of business investment in R&D to variation in this cost.2 We also compare the
increase in BERD as a share of value added (R&D intensity) that has occurred in
the UK, and notably in the manufacturing sector, since the introduction of these
tax credits, with the size and speed of the increase in manufacturing R&D intensity
that could have been expected on the basis of this previous empirical evidence.
In particular, we follow the approach of Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (2002)
to measure the e¤ect of the introduction of these R&D tax credits on the user
cost of capital for R&D investment by large UK rms, and we use their reported
econometric model to simulate the e¤ect of the introduction of these tax incentives
on UK manufacturing R&D intensity over the period 2002-2008. If anything, we
nd that R&D intensity in the UK manufacturing sector has increased further
and faster over this period than would have been predicted. We also nd that
this boom in UK manufacturing BERD is not simply a reection of trends in
1We follow the o¢ cial and widely used terminology in referring to these UK tax incentives
as R&D tax credits, although technically they operate as super-deductions rather than credits.
The key changes to the UK tax treatment of R&D spending will be described in section 3 below.
2Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Ientile and Mairesse (2009) provide surveys of this literature.
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manufacturing BERD in neighbouring economies, although we recognise that this
increase in UK manufacturing R&D intensity could be caused by many factors
other than the introduction of these R&D tax credits.
2 Background
Tax incentives for R&D were introduced in the UK in the period 2000-02 following
a long period during which concerns had been expressed about both the low level
and the declining trend of UK BERD as a share of GDP, particularly in relation to
developments in other advanced economies. Figure 1 compares OECD gures for
this measure of aggregate R&D intensity for the UK, the USA, Japan, Germany,
France, Sweden and Finland in the 1990s,3 as well as in the subsequent period
through 2007.
[Figure 1 here]
At rst sight, the introduction of the UK R&D tax credits appears to have
done little to arrest this picture of relative decline. Looking at the UK series
in more detail (Figure 2) does however suggest a break in the downward trend
from around 2003 onwards. Moreover, some 75%-80% of UK BERD is done in
the manufacturing sector,4 and the share of the manufacturing sector in the UK
economy has continued to fall over this period.5 This compositional shift has
certainly contributed to the impression of a rather modest impact of the tax credits
on UKBERDwhen total BERD is considered as a share of total GDP, as in Figures
1 and 2.
3Van Reenen (1997) provides a more thorough discussion of comparative trends in R&D
intensity in the late 20th Century.
4ONS Annual BERD datasets, Table 1.
5For example, manufacturing value added fell from 20% of GDP in 1997 to 13% of GDP in
2007 (OECD STAN database).
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[Figure 2 here]
A quite di¤erent picture emerges when we consider manufacturing BERD as
a share of manufacturing value added (Figure 3). This measure of manufacturing
sector R&D intensity has increased from about 6.4% in 2001 to 7.3% in 2008, or by
around 14% since the introduction of the R&D tax credit for large rms.6 Within
the manufacturing sector, R&D intensity has risen to levels that are substantially
higher than those experienced over the previous two decades, reversing a gentle
downward trend over the period from 1981-2001. Certainly there are reasons other
than the introduction of R&D tax credits why UK manufacturing R&D intensity
may have increased after 2002. We can note that the recovery in manufacturing
R&D intensity began in 1998, which considerably predates the introduction of
R&D tax credits (Figure 3). We can also note that manufacturing BERD as a
share of manufacturing value added has increased in other developed countries
over this period (Figure 4). Nevertheless the boom in UK manufacturing BERD
after 2002 is at least consistent with an important e¤ect from the introduction of
these R&D tax incentives, and prompts us to consider how the magnitude of this
increase compares with leading estimates of the likely scale of the impact of these
R&D tax credits.
[Figure 3 here]
[Figure 4 here]
3 The UK R&D tax credits
For both tax and accounting purposes, R&D costs are classied into current costs,
reecting the use of labour, energy and materials in R&D programs, and capi-
6We focus on the introduction of the R&D tax credit for large rms, as ONS gures indicate
that less than 4% of UK BERD was done by rms that were eligible for the SME tax credit in
the years following 2000 (ONS Annual BERD databases, Table 26).
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tal costs, reecting the use of durable plant, machinery and buildings in R&D
programs. Current expenditures on wages, energy and materials comprise the
vast majority of R&D costs, with the share of capital costs being only around 10
percent.7
Before the introduction of R&D tax credits, current costs related to R&D were
deductible from taxable prots, in just the same way as other current costs related
to production, distribution, marketing, and so on. Some capital investment used
exclusively for scientic researchqualied for the Scientic Research Allowance
(SRA), which provided a 100% rst year allowance (expensing treatment) for this
investment. This treatment of qualifying R&D capital costs was more generous
than the schedules of capital allowances which provide tax relief for depreciation
on most forms of investment in plant, machinery and buildings. However the SRA
provided only limited scal support for R&D programs, given the small share of
capital costs in total R&D costs, and the narrow statutory denition of scientic
research.
The possibility of introducing a more favourable tax treatmentfor R&D was
rst discussed in the Pre-Budget Report of November 1997, the rst such state-
ment by Chancellor Gordon Brown in the rst year of the new Labour government.
A new tax incentive for R&D undertaken by SMEs was introduced in the Budget
Statement of March 2000. This was followed two years later by the introduction
of a separate scheme for larger companies.
During the period 2000-2008, the R&D creditfor SMEs allowed eligible rms
to deduct 150 percent of their qualifying R&D expenses from their taxable income.8
7Cameron (1996).
8This super-deduction is in principle worth more to a rm paying tax at 30% than to a rm
paying tax at 20%; while a pure tax credit calculated, for example, as 20% of 150% of qualifying
R&D expenses and creditable against their tax liability would be worth £ 0.30 for each £ 1 of
R&D expenditure, for all tax-paying rms.
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SMEs were dened, in line with EU State Aid rules, as entities with a maximum
of 250 employees, and either a balance sheet size of at most 43 million Euros, or
turnover not exceeding 50 million Euros.9 Qualifying R&D expenses correspond
broadly to the accounting treatment of current R&D expenditures, with some
additional restrictions.10 The tax relief is based on the volume of R&D spending,
rather than some incrementalcomponent over a specied base level of R&D, as
used for example in the US Research and Experimentation Credit.11 An interesting
feature of the R&D tax credit for SMEs is that it is refundablefor rms which
do not have positive taxable prots, with cash credits available up to 16 percent
of the rms surrenderable losses.
During the period 2002-2008, the tax incentive for larger rms allowed rms
not eligible for the SME scheme to deduct 125 percent of their qualifying R&D
expenses, with no cash credits available to larger rms with tax losses. We can also
note that from 2000, the Scientic Research Allowance was replaced by Research
and Development Allowances (R&DA), which extended the coverage of 100 percent
rst year allowances to a much broader class of qualied capital expenditure on
R&D, in line with Frascati Manual denitions. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that
current R&D costs are treated more favorably than capital investment, under both
of the R&D tax credits available for either SMEs or larger rms.
From 2008, these R&D tax credits for current R&D expenses have become more
generous. In 2008, the enhanced deduction rates were increased to 175 percent for
SMEs and to 130 percent for larger rms. At the same time the eligibility criteria
9The EC Recommendation on State Aid 2003/361/EC contains further detail about the
restrictions of the SME denition. These restrictions apply to the UK R&D Tax Relief scheme.
10The UK accounting treatment is governed by SSAP 13, itself based on the OECD Frascati
Manual denitions of pure research, applied research and development activities. Additional
restrictions are set out in Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Guidelines and HMRC
Manuals.
11See, for example, Rao (2011).
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for the SME credit were broadened, with the thresholds applied to employment,
assets and turnover all doubled. The enhanced deduction rate for SMEs was
further increased to 200 percent in 2011 and to 225 percent in 2012. At the same
time, the availability of cash credits has been restricted to remain within EU State
Aid rules.
4 The user cost of capital for R&D
From an economic perspective, all outlays on R&D have the character of an in-
vestment, in that they are expected to contribute to higher prots in future years,
rather than adding immediately to production or sales. The standard analysis of
the e¤ect of tax incentives on R&D investment then follows the user cost of capital
approach, pioneered by Jorgensen (1963) and Hall and Jorgensen (1967) for the
analysis of investment in tangible xed assets. Normalising the price of a unit of
R&D to one, the user cost can also be thought of as the required rate of return
from the marginal R&D investment, or the rate of return at which the rm is just
indi¤erent between undertaking or not undertaking an additional unit of R&D.
We follow Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (2002) in measuring the user cost
of capital for R&D as:
U =

1  A
1  

(r + )
where r is the discount rate,  is the rate of economic depreciation,  is the
corporate income tax rate and A is the present value of any current or future tax
credits or allowances associated with an additional unit of R&D investment. An
expensing treatment sets A =  and leaves the required rate of return unchanged
by the presence of the corporate income tax, while a super-deduction sets A > 
and reduces the required rate of return.
More specically, we follow Bloom et al. (2002) in calculating this user cost
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of capital separately for three forms of R&D which had di¤erent tax treatments
over part of our sample period. These are current expenditure, for which we use a
depreciation rate of 0.3; capital expenditure on plant and machinery, for which we
use a depreciation rate of 0.1264; and capital expenditure on buildings, for which
we use a depreciation rate of 0.0361. In each case the discount rate is an ex post
real interest rate, calculated using the nominal yield on 10 year government bonds
and the GDP deator,12 and the tax rate is the main rate of corporation tax paid
by companies with annual prots above £ 1.5 million. For current R&D expenses,
the value of tax savings simply reects the expensing treatment before 2002 and
the super-deduction available to large rms from 2002 onwards. For both types of
capital expenditures, we assume expensing treatment under the R&DA from 2000
onwards. Before 2000, we follow Bloom et al. (2000) in assuming that expensing
was not available, given the narrow coverage of the SRA. In these cases we assume
that standard capital allowances were used, and follow the approach detailed in
Bloom et al. (2000) to estimate the present value of these current and future
allowances both for plant and machinery and for industrial buildings.
Again following Bloom et al. (2002), we obtain our measure of the user cost
of capital for R&D as a weighted average of these three series, with weights of
0.9 for current expenses, 0.064 for investment in plant and machinery, and 0.036
for investment in buildings, based on Cameron (1996). We calculate this measure
over the period from 1981 onwards. For the overlapping sample period 1981-97,
our series is very close to that reported for the UK in Bloom et al. (2002).
Figure 5 shows the e¤ect of the introduction of the tax credit for large rms
in 2002 on this measure of the user cost of capital for R&D. The e¤ect is a step
reduction from a required rate of return of about 0.31 to a required rate of return
12These series are obtained from OECD Economic Outlook.
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of about 0.27, a fall of about 13%. In the next section we combine this change
in the user cost of capital with the econometric model presented in Bloom et al.
(2002) to simulate the impact of this tax change on the UK manufacturing R&D
intensity.
[Figure 5 here]
5 Simulating the e¤ect of tax credits on manu-
facturing R&D intensity
Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (2002) used annual panel data for 9 countries,13
with value added data obtained from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN)
database, and BERD data from the ANBERD component of the STAN database.
They estimated a dynamic specication for the logarithm of manufacturing sector
R&D intensity, of the form:
xit = xi;t 1 + uit + fi + tt + it
where xit is the natural log of R&D intensity (BERD as a share of value added) in
country i in year t, uit is the natural log of the user cost of capital for R&D, fi is a
country-specic xed e¤ect, tt is a year-specic xed e¤ect, and it is the residual
error term. The steady state solution to this model relates the log of BERD to
the log of value added with a coe¢ cient of unity, and to the log of the user cost
with a long run elasticity of =(1   ). This formulation can in turn be derived
from a demand for R&D capital model with prot maximisation and constant
returns to scale, exploiting proportionality between the ow variable BERD and
the corresponding R&D capital stock in a steady state setting where both are
growing at the same constant rate.
13Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK and USA.
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Recognising that real interest rates and R&D intensity may be determined
simultaneously, Bloom et al. used the tax component of the user cost (i.e. ln[(1 
Ait)=(1    it)]) as an instrumental variable for the log of the user cost. Their
preferred results for the manufacturing sector gave estimates of  = 0:850 (with a
standard error of 0:045), suggesting slow adjustment of R&D intensities to changes
in the user cost, and  =  0:143 (0:059), suggesting a signicant e¤ect of tax
incentives summarised in the user cost measure. These estimates imply a long
run user cost elasticity of  0:957 (0:027), which is not signicantly di¤erent from
unity in absolute value.
Using this estimate, it is immediately clear that the step reduction of about
13% in the user cost of capital resulting from the introduction of the R&D tax
credit for large rms in 2002 is expected to increase R&D intensity in the UK
manufacturing sector by about 13% in the long run. Figure 6 compares the ac-
tual increase after 2002 with this prediction. If we had started from the long run
equilibrium R&D intensity in 2001, and if there had been no other changes in any
relevant determinants of this desired R&D intensity after 2002, this comparison
suggests that the actual increase in UK manufacturing R&D intensity had sur-
passed the predicted increase from the Bloom et al. model by 2007. Certainly both
of these assumptions would be heroic, but nevertheless this comparison suggests
that the magnitude of the increase in UK manufacturing R&D intensity after the
introduction of this tax credit has been in the ballpark suggested by the Bloom et
al. model.
[Figure 6 here]
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5.1 Dynamic adjustment
The dynamic model estimated by Bloom et al. (2002) predicts that this increase
in R&D intensity should occur gradually, reecting costs of adjustment or other
frictions. The estimated coe¢ cient of 0:85 on the lagged dependent variable in
the model implies that it would take around 20 years to complete 95 percent of
the predicted long run increase in R&D intensity. Inspection of Figure 6 then
suggests that manufacturing R&D intensity has increased more quickly after 2002
than this model predicts.
To conrm this, we calculate the predicted increase in manufacturing R&D
intensity for each year from 2002 onwards, assuming that we start from the long
run equilbrium R&D intensity in 2001 and introduce a step decrease in the user
cost of capital of about 13% in 2002, with no other changes in any determinants
of R&D intensity. Table 1 summarises the percentage of the long run adjustment
that the model predicts to be completed in each year through 2016, and Figure 7
plots these predicted increases against the actual series for manufacturing R&D
intensity. This illustrates that UK manufacturing R&D intensity has increased by
considerably more over this period than would be predicted on the basis of the
dynamic adjustment path estimated by Bloom et al. (2002).
[Figure 7 here]
To summarise this di¤erence, we consider a simple time series regression of
the actual UK manufacturing R&D intensity on a variable which summarises the
predicted increases from 2002 onwards implied by the Bloom et al. model. More
precisely, we construct a variable which takes the value zero for all years up to
2001, and then tracks the cumulative predicted increase in this R&D intensity
above the level in 2001 (as shown in Figure 7) for the subsequent years. If the
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Bloom et al. model predicted the increases from 2002 onwards perfectly, we would
expect a coe¢ cient of one on this predicted increase variable. The regression is
estimated using annual data for the period 1991-2007. The results, presented in
the rst column of Table 2, in fact suggest a coe¢ cient of 3.607 (0.477) on the
predicted increase from the model, which is signicantly higher than one. Again
this reects that the actual increase in UK manufacturing R&D intensity after
2002 has outpaced the increase that we would have predicted on the basis of the
impact of the R&D tax credit for larger rms on the user cost of capital, and
the estimated relationship between the user cost and manufacturing sector R&D
intensity reported in Bloom et al. (2002).
5.2 Other factors
Clearly there are many other reasons why R&D intensity may have grown strongly
in the UK manufacturing sector after 2002 - some of these may have been cap-
tured by the year dummies included in the country-panel regression specication
used by Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (2002), and others may not. To probe
the robustness of our nding that manufacturing R&D intensity appears to have
increased faster than at least a naïve prediction based on their model would sug-
gest, we briey consider adding some control variables to the simple regression
specication reported in Table 2.
Figure 3 suggests a cyclical pattern in the ratio of manufacturing BERD to
manufacturing value added. To control for this inuence, we introduce the annual
growth rate of manufacturing value added as an additional explanatory variable.
The result, reported in the second column of Table 2, indicates that R&D intensity
tends to be lower when manufacturing output is growing rapidly, consistent with
some stickiness in the level of manufacturing BERD. However UK manufacturing
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growth was not notably slow in the period following the introduction of the R&D
tax credit, and this factor does not account for the discrepancy between actual
and predicted increases in R&D intensity after 2002.
Figure 4 illustrates that manufacturing R&D intensity was also increasing in
other countries during this period, for reasons which were presumably unrelated
to the introduction of R&D tax credits in the UK. To allow for this background
trend, we construct a weighted average of the manufacturing R&D intensities in
France and Germany,14 two economies that are similar to the UK in terms of size,
location and income per capita.15 Three aspects of the result, reported in the
third column of Table 2, are noteworthy. First, the estimated coe¢ cient on this
background trend term is positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero. Second,
the inclusion of this background trend term signicantly reduces the estimated
coe¢ cient on our predicted increase term, but leaves this coe¢ cient signicantly
di¤erent from zero. This factor helps to explain some of the increase in man-
ufacturing R&D intensity in the UK, particularly in the period after 2002, but
does not fully account for it. These aspects of the result are quite robust to using
di¤erent sets of countries to construct the control, or to using di¤erent weighted
averages. Third, the estimated coe¢ cient on our predicted increase series is now
insignicantly di¤erent from one, suggesting that once we allow for international
trends in manufacturing sector R&D intensities, the increase in the UK after 2002
may not be signicantly di¤erent from the e¤ect of the R&D tax credit predicted
by the Bloom et al. model. This feature of the result is however highly sensitive
to the precise way we control for the background trend.16
14GDP weights are used in the specication reported.
15Broadly similar results were obtained when using data from more countries to proxy for this
background trend, or when using other weighted averages.
16For example, if we take the view that part of the increase in France over this period reects
important changes to R&D tax credits in France (see Mairesse and Mulkay, 2011), and use only
the manufacturing R&D intensity in Germany as our control for background trends, we continue
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6 Trends within manufacturing
We end this paper with a note of caution. We have documented that the intro-
duction of the R&D tax credit for larger rms in the UK was followed by a sharp
increase in the ratio of manufacturing BERD to manufacturing value added. This
increase in manufacturing sector R&D intensity seems to be at least as large, and
has perhaps occurred faster, than would have been predicted by one of the leading
econometric studies of the e¤ects of tax incentives for R&D. However if the main
reason for this increase in manufacturing R&D intensity is the introduction of
these tax credits, we might expect the increase to be common across sub-sectors
within manufacturing. This has not been the case.
Figure 8A shows the series for R&D intensity for four sub-sectors of UK man-
ufacturing, classied by the OECD as high technology, medium-high technology,
medium-low technology and low technology sub-sectors.17 The increase from 2002
(or indeed from 1998) onwards has been heavily concentrated in high tech areas of
manufacturing. Figures 8B and 8C show that this has not been the case in either
Germany or France. While high tech manufacturing now accounts for about two
thirds of total manufacturing BERD in the UK, the stability of the R&D intensity
series for the remaining sub-sectors of UK manufacturing casts some doubt on the
role of R&D tax credits in explaining the growth in total manufacturing BERD.
There may be explanations for this pattern - for example, the introduction of R&D
tax credits may be more important in expanding sectors than in declining sectors,
or the unobserved counterfactual may have been one in which R&D intensity would
have collapsed in the medium and low tech sub-sectors of UK manufacturing in
to nd a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the series for Germany (0.504, with a standard
error of 0.170), but we then estimate a larger coe¢ cient on the predicted increase term (2.875,
with a standard error of 0.404).
17OECD STI Scoreboard (2003) provides a discussion of how two digit and three digit sub-
sectors are allocated to these technology classes.
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the absence of the R&D tax credits. Nevertheless further research will be needed
to provide supporting evidence for either these or alternative explanations of these
trends within manufacturing.
[Figure 8 here]
7 Conclusion
This paper has noted that although there has not been a marked increase in total
BERD as a share of GDP for the UK economy as a whole in the period following
the introduction of R&D tax credits in 2000-02, there has been a sharp increase in
the ratio of BERD to value added in the manufacturing sector, where most BERD
is performed. This increase is masked in the aggregate gures by the continued
decline in the manufacturing sector as a share of the UK economy.
The increase in R&D intensity in the UK manufacturing sector after 2002
is broadly in line with the predicted increase based on the econometric model
presented in Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (2002). If anything, manufacturing
R&D intensity has risen faster than their model predicts. This increase is not
fully explained by cyclical uctuations, nor by trends in neighbouring economies.
However we recognise that there may be other explanations for the boom in UK
manufacturing BERD following the introduction of these tax credits, and further
research will be needed to reach a more denitive conclusion on the causal impact
of the introduction of these tax incentives for R&D. One aspect to be explained
is that the increase in manufacturing sector R&D intensity in the UK has been
almost wholly concentrated in high tech sub-sectors of manufacturing, with almost
no increase in R&D intensity observed for the rest of the manufacturing sector.
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Table 1: Percent of total adjustment by year
2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 12 14 16 1
15% 28% 39% 48% 56% 62% 68% 73% 77% 83% 88% 91% 100%
Table 2: Regression results
I II III
Predicted increase 3.607 3.513 2.076
(0.477) (0.391) (0.571)
Manufacturing growth -0.066 -0.046
(0.028) (0.015)
Background trend 0.731
(0.218)
Constant 0.057 0.056 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.016)
N 17 17 17
F-stat 57.14 48.34 43.77
16
Figure 1: BERD intensity: whole economy
Source: OECD ANBERD and STAN databases
Figure 2: UK BERD intensity: whole economy
Source: ONS BERD series (Table SB1), Nov-2011 and IMF IFS Annual Series for GDP, Jan-2012
17
Figure 3: UK BERD intensity: manufacturing sector
Source: OECD STAN and ANBERD databases (NACE Rev.3). For the years 1981-1986, OECD
archive data based on NACE Rev.2 is used.
Figure 4: BERD intensity: manufacturing sector
Source: OECD STAN and ANBERD databases (NACE Rev.3)
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Figure 5: User cost of R&D investments in the UK
Figure 6: Predicted and actual manufacturing BERD intensity, instant adjustment
Source: OECD, Bloom et al (2002), own calculations
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Figure 7: Actual and predicted BERD intensity, gradual adjustment
Source: OECD, Bloom et al (2002), own calculations
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